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Abstract 
This paper documents that corporate innovation is negatively affected by 
the dual-class ownership structure, featured by the control-ownership 
wedge due to two classes of common stock with differing voting rights, in 
a global setting. We measure innovation by the number of patents and patent 
citations, capturing the quantity and quality of innovation, respectively. The 
negative association is moderated by firm growth opportunities, higher 
reporting quality and stronger external disciplinary mechanisms. 
Additionally, we analyze the potential mechanisms driving this result and 
document that an underlying mechanism is the managerial consumption of 
private control benefits as represented by the voting premium attached to 
the superior voting shares. However, we find that the negative association 
is confined to old and mature firms. Thus, while the dual-class structure 
appears to nurture corporate innovation at an early stage of a firm, this 
structure hampers corporate innovation at a later stage, arguably due to 
managerial consumption of control benefits through the innovative projects. 
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1. Introduction 
The notion that innovation is a critical determinant of economic growth dates back to 
Schumpeter (1939). He states that “carrying out innovations is the only function which is 
fundamental in history” (Schumpeter, 1939, p. 102). Innovation, which includes the creation of 
new business methods, development of new technologies, and introduction of new products and 
services to consumers, is the most significant force of firms’ long-term success and survival 
(Solow, 1957; Romer, 1990). Recognizing the importance of corporate innovation in both firm- 
and economy-level growth, a growing body of literature investigates the effect of corporate 
governance upon the success of firms’ innovation. However, prior research focuses on the U.S. 
market and generated mixed results (Becker-Blease, 2011; Atanassov, 2013; Chakraborty, 
Rzakhanov, and Sheikh, 2014). Our study aims to shed light upon this issue by examining whether 
and how the success of firm innovation is affected by the “extreme corporate governance,” that is, 
the dual-class structure that is featured by the control-ownership wedge due to two classes of 
common stock with differing voting rights (Gompers et al., 2009, page 1). In particular, we 
examine this research topic across countries to capture the cross-country variation of external 
shareholder disciplining mechanisms and corporate governance, which should accentuate the costs 
and benefits of consuming private benefit by not investing in innovation.  
A firm has a dual-class structure if it has at least two classes of shares with differential 
voting rights —one class of shares has higher voting rights on a per share basis (e.g., eight votes 
per share) while another class has lower or zero voting rights (e.g., zero vote per share). This 
structure delegates the decision power only to few controlling insiders and shareholders, thus 
challenging the core concept that those who provide the capital should have a vote on corporate 
affairs. Nonetheless, in a letter to its shareholders, the founders of Google stated (Marriage, 2017): 
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“outside pressures . . . often tempt companies to sacrifice long-term opportunities to meet quarterly market 
expectations. … […] In the transition to public ownership, we have set up a corporate structure that … will … make 
it easier for our management team to follow the long term, innovative approach emphasized earlier. This structure, 
called a dual class voting structure” […] “… we have designed a corporate structure that will protect Google's ability 
to innovate.” 
 
However, because of this feature of dual-class structure, regulators and practitioners like 
investment management firms express concerns and suggest restrictions on its use: “State Street 
has urged the US financial regulator to block companies from adopting controversial voting 
structures used by Facebook, Alphabet, and Snap over concerns that they concentrate power in the 
hands of founders and weaken shareholder rights” (Marriage, 2017). In spite of this concern, this 
dual-class structure has become more popular globally, particularly in the US, Brazil, Canada, 
France, Italy, Denmark, and Finland. Approximately 16% of companies that have gone public on 
US exchanges since 2013, for example, had at least two classes of stock (Marriage, 2017). In 
particular, our paper relates to the recent debate among regulators and practitioners on whether 
dual-class firms should be banned and if yes for how long. Thus, our analysis has timely policy 
implications because while investors consider the increasing usage of the dual-class structure, 
regulators express concerns and suggest restrictions on its use at a firm’s later stage. On March 15, 
2018, a senior Democratic regulator proposed, “Corporate titans who control companies through 
special classes of stock that give them extra voting power should have to give up the system after 
a limited number of years.” Our international evidence appears to lend some support for this 
proposition.  
Theoretically, two different views exist regarding whether and how the dual-class structure 
can hamper or promote firm-level innovation. One view focuses on the notion that the control-
ownership wedge, which is created by different voting rights, can increase managerial risk 
tolerance by protecting managers from the short-term nature of the stock market. Theory predicts 
that the myopic nature of stock markets (a strong incentive to pursue short-term gains) could 
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induce firms to invest suboptimal (Stein, 1989; Holmstrom, 1989; Acharya and Lambrecht, 2015; 
Ferreira, Manso, and Silva, 2014). Because the development of new technologies, product designs, 
and production processes takes a considerable amount of time to materialize and the probability of 
success is uncertain, innovative firms may often fail to meet or beat the market expectation in the 
short term. This failure can, in turn, make the firm vulnerable to a takeover threat or the managers 
to forced turnover; managers are subject to complete career consequences when innovation falls 
apart due to merely stochastic factors (Hirshleifer, 1993; Kaplan and Minton, 2012). If explicit 
contracts cannot completely resolve the incentive issue, the wedge can insulate managers from 
unjustified takeover threat or career concerns by putting a majority of shares with superior voting 
rights to controlling insiders. In a multiperiod contracting setting, managers at the dual-class firms 
are therefore incentivized to engage in more innovative investments. The dual-class structure can 
thus promote innovation (risk tolerance hypothesis).  
The other view on the effect of dual-class structure on firm-level corporate innovation 
focuses on agency issues. Agency issues originate from the fact that the dual-class structure gives 
the controlling shareholders one-hundred percent of the benefits of the resources they expropriate, 
but the costs of expropriation are limited to their percentage ownership of the firm’s cash flow 
rights (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002). As the 
ownership-control wedge increases, controlling insiders can avoid pro rata consequences of their 
consumption of private benefits. Thus, expected private control benefits increase and associated 
costs decrease (Fan and Wong, 2002; Nenova, 2003; Doidge, 2004). As a result, controlling 
insiders of high-wedge firms are more likely to extract rents than those of low-wedge firms, 
thereby resulting in a positive association between the wedge and size of private control benefits 
that the controlling insiders extract from the firm. Prior research documents that the dual-class 
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structure is accompanied by managerial consumption of private benefits around the world (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, 
and Lang, 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Lins, 2003). Relatedly, prior researchers argue that the 
control-ownership wedge arising from the dual-class structure puts the controlling power to few 
insiders and managers, thus allowing these insiders to operate their firm in secrecy and conceal 
their rent extraction by providing lower-quality financial reporting to external shareholders (Fan 
and Wong, 2002; Francis, Schipper, and Vincent, 2005). This adverse effect of the wedge is 
predicted to be more severe for firms with investments in innovation; the innovation takes a long 
period of time and is subject to uncertainty of success and secrecy (Hall, 2002), exposing outside 
shareholders to managerial misbehavior. In a multi-task setting, risk-averse managers that 
perpetuate their controlling power through the dual-class structure may naturally shirk intangible 
R&D investments since they are riskier than capital investments (Kothari et al., 2002). Managers 
may also engage in empire building, or squander away corporate resource on pet projects. The 
managers’ dysfunctional behavior can, in turn, because outside shareholders to price-protect 
themselves, thereby creating financial frictions. The increased financial frictions can hamper 
innovation for firms with high wedge. Under this scenario, the wedge can exacerbate agency costs, 
thus hampering corporate innovation (agency cost hypothesis).  
Given the contrasting predictions, it is an empirical question how the dual-class ownership 
structure relates to innovative activities. On the empirical front, a recent study by Atanassov (2013) 
documents the negative effect of the enactment and provisions of antitakeover laws upon firm 
innovation. However, Becker-Blease (2011) find no effect and Chakraborty, Rzakhanov and 
Sheikh (2014) find insignificant effect for high-tech firms, which are expected to innovate 
uninterruptedly to survive in the long run. Using a regression discontinuity approach that is based 
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on exogenous shock to shareholder proposal votes across states, Chemmanur and Tian (2017) 
document a positive effect of antitakeover provisions on innovation. Their finding suggests that 
antitakeover provisions help promote innovation by protecting managers from equity market short-
termism. Given the mixed evidence on the effect of corporate governance upon firm innovation in 
the U.S. market, we strive to provide a more complete picture on this topic by examining whether 
the “extreme corporate governance,” the dual-class structure, alters firm innovation in a global 
setting (Gompers et al., 2009.1  
Using a hand-collected panel data set of 327 dual-class firms in 18 countries for the period 
1993 to 2010, we investigate the association between dual-class ownership structure and corporate 
innovation. We perform a firm-level regression analysis where the dependent variable is a measure 
of corporate innovation and the key independent variable of interest is dual-class structure 
characteristics, such as the ownership-control wedge and the size of voting premium. Specifically, 
we proxy for firm-level innovation using two distinct measures: the number of patents, which 
indicates the quantity of innovation, and the number of patent citations, which represents the 
quality of innovation (Trajtenberg, 1990; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005; Moser, Ohmstedt, 
and Rhode, 2018). While we begin our regression analysis by examining the relationship between 
each of these proxies for innovation and an indicator variable for dual-class firms, our main 
analysis is focused on the ownership-control wedge, which formally quantifies the divergence 
between voting and cash flow rights in a dual-class firm. The reason is that the wedge provides the 
mechanism through which innovation for the dual-class firm can increase or decrease. Specifically, 
                                               
1 Moreover, the research on the relationship between the dual-class structure and innovation is scant except a 
contemporaneous study by Baran, Forst, and Via (2017). Using US data, they find a positive effect of enhanced 
managerial entrenchment from dual-class status on nurturing innovation. One potential explanation for these 
findings is that the external corporate governance in the US, securities laws, and legal enforcements, which better 
protects the interest of the outside shareholders. 
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superior voting shares have considerably greater voting rights than their cash flow rights on a per 
share basis, compared to inferior voting shares. Superior voting shares are generally owned by 
controlling insiders of a firm and yield a noteworthy wedge between their voting and cash flow 
rights.  A firm’s ownership-control wedge (i.e., the separation between voting rights and cash flow 
rights) is empirically estimated by one minus voting rights scaled by cash flow rights for inferior 
voting shares. The wedge ranges between zero and unity. The wedge becomes zero as the voting 
and cash flow rights of the inferior shares become equal and becomes one as the voting rights of 
the inferior shares is zero.  
First, we find an economically significant and negative relationship between ownership-
control wedge and the measures for innovation, on average, evidence consistent with the agency 
cost hypothesis. A one standard deviation in the control-ownership wedge (18.98%) is associated 
with 2.34% and 1.58% decrease in the logarithm of one plus the number of patents and the 
logarithm of one plus the number of citations. 
Secondly and importantly, the impact may vary depending upon firm age. For young firms 
with greater growth opportunities, the costs of managerial rent extraction from the innovative projects 
(i.e., losing growth opportunities) are likely to exceed its benefits. They may thus choose to 
continuously invest in innovative projects. Furthermore, the wedge, which puts the controlling power 
to founders and controlling insiders, can protect managers at young firms from the short-term pressure 
from equity markets. They can thus focus on value creation through long-term innovative projects, 
consistent with the risk tolerance hypothesis. In contrast, for old and mature firms, which already 
established their business practices and procedures and accomplished innovation, managers may prefer 
to extract rents from the past innovation success. The wedge of the dual-class structure facilitates their 
asset appropriation by reducing pro rata consequences of controlling insiders’ consumption of private 
benefits. This prediction is consistent with the agency cost hypothesis.  
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Consistently, for younger firms we document a positive and economically significant 
relationship between the wedge and the measures for innovation; evidence in support of risk 
tolerance conjecture. For example, a one standard deviation in the control-ownership wedge 
(20.79%) is associated with 5.73% and 9.98% increase in the logarithm of one plus the number of 
patents and the logarithm of one plus the number of citations. However, we provide further 
evidence that the effect is reversed to old and mature firms, precisely the ones that external 
shareholders should pay attention to because the extra capital provides managers room to shirk 
activities and seek out private benefits at the shareholders’ expense.  We document an 
economically significant and negative relationship between ownership-control wedge and the 
measures for innovation for older firms, evidence consistent with the agency cost hypothesis. 
Specifically, an increase of one standard deviation in the control-ownership wedge (18.28%) is 
associated with 4.11% and 2.72% decrease in the logarithm of one plus number of patents and the 
logarithm of one plus number of citations, respectively. These results have the policy implication 
that the dual-class structure may need to be banned at a later stage of a given firm. Our results are 
robust to different regression specifications, the inclusion of a battery of control variables 
previously known to affect innovation, as well as to a two-stage simultaneous equation procedure, 
which addresses the potential endogeneity concern, where factors related to the choice of dual-
class structure can simultaneously influence corporate innovation.  
We implement a set of additional analyses intended to strengthen our identification strategy 
regarding how the ownership-control wedge alters a firm’s innovative activities. These additional 
analyses allow us to clearly distinguish between the risk tolerance hypothesis and the agency cost 
hypothesis. Specifically, we investigate whether the negative relationship between the wedge and 
innovation is affected by firms with opaque financial reporting. Following Leuz, Nanda, and 
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Wysocki (2003), Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003), and Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008), we 
use the extent to which a firm engages in earnings smoothing as a proxy for a firm’s financial 
reporting opacity. The theoretical model by Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) states that managers 
smooth out firm-specific information to conceal their consumption of private control benefits. We 
document that the negative relationship between the wedge and innovation is largely driven by 
firms with opaque financial reporting. This result is consistent with the view that the wider the 
wedge between voting rights and cash-flow rights, coupled with opaque information disclosure, 
the greater the impediment to innovation.  
Additionally, we examine whether the strength of external disciplining mechanism 
moderates the negative relationship between the wedge and firm innovation. In an environment 
where disciplining by external stakeholders is more effective, it makes it more difficult for the 
controlling shareholders/managers to act opportunistically and extract private benefits. With 
different disciplining mechanisms in place, firms have different cost and benefits associated with 
dual-class structure. Therefore, we hypothesize that the relationship between dual-class structure 
and innovation varies with the degree of external disciplining mechanisms. We test this hypothesis 
by using four proxies of external disciplining mechanisms: (i) the anti-self-dealing country index 
developed in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), (ii) the number of analysts 
following the firm, (iii) institutional ownership, and (iv) industry-level growth opportunities. We 
provide evidence that these country-level, industry-level, and firm-level disciplining mechanisms 
moderate the negative relationship between the ownership-control wedge and innovation. These 
findings are consistent with the notion that factors that constrain controlling insiders’ ability to 
consume private benefits of control help promote innovation.  
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We provide supplementary tests that strive to provide more direct evidence on whether 
managerial consumption of private benefits are underlying mechanisms that contribute to the 
negative correlation between the ownership-control wedge and innovation. While estimating the 
size of private control benefits is empirically challenging, we follow the literature and measure the 
size of private control benefits through the voting premium for firms with a dual-class share 
structure (Nenova, 2003; Doidge, 2004). Further, we provide evidence that the voting premium is 
negatively associated with the two proxies for firm innovation. These results indicate that private 
benefits of control are the mechanisms underlying the relationship between the ownership-control 
wedge and firm innovation.  
Our study contributes to the emerging literature on factors affecting firm innovation. 
Academic research has been primarily focused on the importance of access to financing and the 
effect of different types of financing on innovation.2 Specifically, prior studies consider the need 
for external financing and investigate how different type of financing via markets such as venture 
capital, debt, equity, or bank credit affect firm-level innovation (Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Kortum 
and Lerner, 2000, 2001; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Atanassov, 2016; Acharya and Xu, 2017).  
Kalcheva, McLemore, and Pant (2018) document that not just industry financing but the trilateral 
intersection of industry, academia, and government fosters the highest level of innovation. It has 
been also shown that bank deregulation (Chava, Oettl, Subramanian, and Subramanian, 2013; 
Cornaggia, Mao, Tian, and Wolfe, 2015; Hombert and Matray, 2017), labor laws (Acharya, 
Baghai, and Subramanian, 2014) and legal systems (Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen, 2013, 2017) 
also play a role in innovation activities. We thus add to this prior work that a specific organization 
structure—the dual-class ownership structure affects innovation in a global setting.  
                                               
2 For an overview of this literature see Rajan (2012) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2014). 
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The current manuscript also relates to a strand of literature that focuses on the dual-class 
structure per se. The extant literature documents that the dual-class structure is associated with 
managerial consumption of private control benefits (Fan and Wong, 2002; Nenova, 2003; Doidge, 
2004), lower firm value (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2010), less informativeness of reported 
earnings (Francis et al., 2005), inefficient corporate operations and investment strategies (Masulis, 
Wang, and Xie, 2009), lower firm performance in the IPO year and in the subsequent five years 
(Smart, Thirumalai, and Zutter, 2008), and higher stock crash risk (Hong, Kim, and Welker, 2017). 
However, the managerial consumption of private benefits associated with the dual-class structure 
is mitigated by takeover regulations, investor protection, and power-concentrating corporate 
charter provisions (Nenova, 2003), cross-listing to US stock exchanges through American 
depositary receipts (Doidge, 2004), and the mandatory adoption of International financial reporting 
standards and concurrent governance improvements in the European Union (Hong, 2013). We 
complement this prior work by documenting that the dual-class structure negatively affects 
innovation.  
The rest of the paper proceeds in the following manner. Section 2 develops our primary 
hypothesis, Section 3 introduces the data, and Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
describes robustness tests, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical motivation and empirical hypotheses 
Theory predicts that the divergence between control and ownership rights arising from the 
dual-class ownership structure can have bright as well as dark side with respect to firm innovation. 
On the bright side, the dual-class ownership structure can permit firm founders, who have 
specialized knowledge for the success of their investment in innovation, to keep their control rights 
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and incentives to invest in organization-specific human capital and innovation, in spite of their 
relatively low ownership rights (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985; Fan and Wong, 2002; Jordan, 
Kim, and Liu, 2016). Innovative investments typically take a long time and uncertainty to be 
converted into financial success, and can thus be costly. Undertaking these projects may, for 
example, lead to a decrease in price in a short run, making the firm vulnerable to a takeover threat 
or the managers to forced turnover. The dual-class structure puts a controlling power to firm 
founders, making them immune from takeover and labor market threats, and allowing them to 
focus on long-term innovative projects rather than engaging in short-term myopic behavior. In 
addition, as the control-ownership wedge allows insiders to control the corporate reporting 
process, the dual class structure may allow them to keep their innovative projects secret from 
potential and current competitors in the product market through financial reporting opacity (Fan 
and Wong, 2002). Firms with the dual-class structure often may choose to be opaque and reduce 
proprietary costs related to firm innovation since they are not subject to the equity market short 
termism and thus do not face the same level of pressure to alleviate information asymmetry 
between the firm and its shareholders. For example, Hall (2002) indicates that significant cost can 
incur when leaking information to competitors, which decreases the quality of signal on a 
prospective innovative project. Thus, to the extent that firms’ opacity associated with the dual-
class structure helps in hiding their innovative activities from the marketplace, it can potentially 
improve a firm’s competitive advantage in the product market and, in turn, encourage its 
innovation endeavor. In this case, the dual-class structure benefits both the controlling insiders and 
external investors by promoting corporate innovation. We refer to this hypothesis as the risk 
tolerance hypothesis because under this conjecture, the dual-class structure enables insiders to 
undertake long-term high-risk innovative positive NPV projects.  
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On the dark side, the ownership-control wedge can create an agency conflict between 
controlling insiders and external investors, thereby hampering corporate innovation. Control 
rights, greater than ownership rights, in dual-class firms create a conflict of interest between 
controlling insiders and external minority shareholders; they provide the former with incentives 
and means to extract rents and secure their private benefits of control at the expense of the latter 
(e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 2000; Bertland, Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2002; Haw, 
Hu, Hwang, and Wu, 2004; and Kim and Yi, 2006). Cases of such benefits are the power to select 
a family member to the board of directors or to propose a family member as chief operating officer. 
Aslo, control benefits may consist of privileges to involve in self-dealing, tunneling, pet projects, 
real estate transaction at a price lower than its appraisal value, and empire building (Grossman and 
Hart, 1988; Barclay and Holderness, 1989; Nenova, 2003). In firms featured by a dual-class 
structure, the wedge facilitates almost complete control over key corporate decisions, such as 
management tenure and compensation, even though keeping low cash flow rights compared to 
voting rights. The low cash flow rights associated with the ownership-control wedge decrease the 
costs that are borne by controlling shareholders when they expropriate resources from the firm. 
This creates incentives for controlling shareholders and/or managers to extract private rents or to 
“tunnel” corporate assets for their private benefits. This adverse effect of the wedge is more severe 
for firms with investments in innovation, as the innovation takes a long period of time and is 
subject to uncertainty of success and secrecy (Hall 2002), exposing outside shareholders to 
managerial rent extraction. The managers’ misbehavior can, in turn, induce outside shareholders 
to price-protect themselves, thereby increasing costs of capital and reducing liquidity. The 
increased financial frictions can impede innovation for firms with high wedge. As a consequence, 
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the wedge can engender agency costs, thus reducing corporate innovation. We refer to this 
hypothesis as the agency cost hypothesis. 
Given the opposing predictions of the risk tolerance and the agency cost hypothesis, how 
the dual-class structure affects innovation becomes an empirical question. Moreover, prior studies 
have documented that young firms are generally the ones that deliver cutting-edge innovation (Acs 
and Audretsch, 1987, 1988, 1993; Zucker, Darby, and Brewer, 1998; Kortum and Lerner, 2000; 
Darby and Zucker, 2003; Samila and Sorenson, 2010; Chava et al., 2013). For these firms, the costs 
of managerial rent extraction through the innovative projects (i.e., forgoing the innovative projects due 
to the increased costs of external capital) are likely to be greater than its benefits. They thus choose to 
continuously invest in value creation through firm innovation. Given this prior evidence, we expect 
that the agency cost hypothesis will prevail for old firms, while the risk tolerance hypothesis 
prevails for younger firms.  
Further, we hypothesize that the trade-offs between the costs and benefits accompanied by 
dual-class structure will be dependent upon the strength of the various external disciplining 
mechanisms that different firms face. We predict that under the agency cost hypothesis, a strong 
disciplining mechanism will have a moderating effect on the predicted negative association 
between dual-class firms and innovation. These external disciplining mechanisms can help outside 
shareholders, auditors and regulators to detect and penalize managerial dysfunctional behavior. On 
the flip side, under the risk tolerance hypothesis, a strong external disciplining system will have 
an aggravating effect on the predicted positive relationship between dual-class firms and 
innovation under this scenario. The reason is that the external disciplining system can potentially 
promote managerial short-termism or myopic behavior. For example, He and Tian (2013) show 
the dark side of analyst coverage; firms followed by a larger number of analysts are less innovative. 
The result is consistent with the view that analysts excessively press managers to meet or beat 
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short-term market targets, hampering firms’ effort to focus on long-term innovative projects. The 
marginal positive effect of the wedge (i.e., anti-takeover mechanism, which allows managers to 
focus on the long-term innovative projects with a greater degree of uncertainty and risk) is thus 
expected to be weaker in circumstances and jurisdictions with strong external disciplining system 
in place. 
Finally, we conjecture that the relation between dual-class structure and innovation varies 
with the quality of firm-level financial reporting. Agency conflicts, such as moral hazard and 
adverse selection, are particularly severe for investments in innovative projects. Innovation is 
typically processed for a long period with high risk and stake, which renders it to be challenging 
for external investors to evaluate expected future cash flows from a certain innovative project 
(Holmstrom, 1989; Brealey, Leland, and Pyle, 1977). Additionally, the opacity in dual-class firms 
can exacerbate information frictions and increase cost of capital by reducing market liquidity or 
exacerbating information risk (Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). 
Prior research documents that greater opacity leads to higher cost of capital and more financial 
constraint. Park (2018) shows that financial reporting quality is associated future innovation. 
Furthermore, firms’ innovative projects involve many unknowns and a high degree of uncertainty 
and take a long time to realize return. Thus, external shareholders may fail to closely monitor and 
discipline the moral hazard problems of dual-class firms in selecting and implementing innovative 
projects. One implication from these studies is that opacity as well as agency conflicts within dual-
class firms can hamper innovation through an external financing venue by aggravating firms’ 
financial market frictions.  
 
3.  Data 
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3.1. Sample and data sources 
We collected data from multiple data sources. To identify dual-class firms outside U.S. we 
use Datastream (available from 1993). Following Nenova (2003) and Doidge (2004), we impose 
the following criteria to identify dual-class firms: (1) firms have to have at the minimum two 
classes of shares with differential voting rights; (2) the two classes of shares have to be openly 
traded on the domestic  stock markets; (3) conversion of inferior voting shares into superior voting 
shares is prohibited (however, the opposite is permitted); (4) a fixed amount of dividend is not 
granted upon these share classes; and (5) the firm cannot redeem or call these share classes at a 
pre-set price. Next, we collect weekly data from the Datastream every Friday for the following 
variables for each share class: return, stock price, number of shares outstanding, market value of 
all equity outstanding, dividends paid during the week, and turnover.3 Further, we exclude firms 
from our sample for which there are less than 26 weekly stock return observations per fiscal year. 
Then, we hand-collect data on the number of voting rights accompanied by the superior and 
inferior voting shares for each firm by employing a range of data sources, such as firms’ annual 
reports, Moody’s International Manuals, Datastream Manuals, filings with national stock 
exchanges, and firm lists originated ad constructed by Doidge (2004).4  
Next, we extract patent data from the Harvard Patent Network Database, which is 
developed by Lai, D’Amour, Yu, Sun, and Fleming (2011) and managed by the Harvard Business 
School.5 The Harvard Patent Network Database provides detailed information on patents awarded 
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to American and international 
                                               
3 If the value of turnover is missing, we extract this value from the Bloomberg database (Doidge, 2004). 
4 In conducting this research, we received significant support from Craig Doidge with respect to data collection. In 
addition, if the data were not clear or unavailable, they were requested from each firm through faxes, emails, and 
phone calls.  
5 The data is available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/15705  
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companies, individuals, and other institutions from 1975 through 2010. Because Datastream 
availability is limited to after 1993 and the patent data ends in 2010, our sample period is limited 
to 1993–2010. 
The final sample includes dual-class companies which have sufficient finance data from 
Datastream and sufficient accounting data from Compustat Global. Our screening procedure and 
hand-collection process identified 336 dual-class firms, a total of 3,412 firm-year observations, for 
the period 1993 to 2010. 
3.2. Propensity score matching 
 A latent concern with respect to the entire sample is that the decision to form dual-class or 
single-class ownership structure may be subject to endogeneity issues. Prior studies document that 
the decision to adopt a dual-class ownership is affected by several factors including managers’ 
private benefits of control (Gompers et al., 2010; Hong, 2013; McGuire, Wang, and Wilson, 2014). 
These articles further show that the choice to establish a dual-class ownership structure at the time 
of the firm’s initial public offering (IPO) is affected by the founding family’s personal stake in the 
business, the firm’s age, the significance of the firm’s local presence at the time of the IPO, and 
the firm’s membership of the media industry.  
To address this endogeneity issue, we use the propensity score matching approach where 
we match observable firm characteristics of the treatment group (dual-class firms) with those of 
the control group (single-class firms) (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Specifically, to estimate the 
propensity score, we perform a probit regression to model the probability of establishing a dual-
class ownership structure, using the samples of both treatment and control firms. We estimate the 
following probit model to predict the adoption of a dual-class ownership structure at the IPO date 
and maintain a dual-class structure during the sample period:  
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Prob(Dual=1) =  
α + β1FAMILYNAMEi + β2MEDIAi + β3LOCALMARKETSHAREi+β4PROFITRANKi + 
β5SALESRANKi + β6LNATi,t + β7RDEXPi,t + β8ROAi,t + β9PPEi,t + β10LEVi,t + β11CAPEXi,t + 
β12BTMi,t + β13HHIi,t + β14HHISQi,t + β15WWINDEXi,t + β16LNFIRMAGEi,t + ε.       (1) 
 
Dual is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is a dual-class firm anytime during 
our study period and zero otherwise. We include the following independent variables in Eq. (1): 
whether the family name is in the company name (FAIMILYNAME), whether the firm belongs to 
the media industry (MEDIA), and the firm’s local presence as measured by 
LOCALMARKETSHARE, PROFITRANK, and SALESRANK). In Eq. (1) we also include a list of 
firm characteristics to control for the influence of managerial decision on the dual-class ownership 
structure (McGuire et al., 2014): firm size (LNAT), R&D expenditure (RDEXP), profitability 
(ROA), tangibility (PPE), leverage (LEV), capital expenditure (CAPEX), the ratio of book value to 
market value of equity (BTM), industry concentration (HHI, HHISQ), index of financial constraints 
(WWINDEX) and firm age (LNFIRMAGE). A detailed description of the variables is available in 
Appendix A. All tables in the paper report results using the matched sample. Results hold when 
we perform our regression analysis based on the full sample (see Appendix B).  
Table C1 in Appendix C reports the estimation results of the probit model in Eq. (1). 
Consistent with prior literature (McGuire et al., 2014), the model reasonably forecasts the choice 
of the dual-class ownership structure. The area under the ROC curve is 0.9673, indicating that our 
selection model has satisfactory discriminatory power (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant, 2013, 
p. 398). 
Based on our yearly estimations of Eq. (1), we calculate a propensity score for each firm-
year that denotes the likelihood that the manager will establish the dual-class ownership structure. 
At the next step, we pair each treatment firm-year observation with the control firm with the nearest 
two matching (Subrahmanyam, et al., 2014). Hence, our final sample comprises of dual-class and 
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single-class firms that have comparable attributes. Table C2 in Appendix C provides the 
standardized differences in the key variables between dual-class firms and single-class firms. The 
results show that the procedure is effective in eliminating most of the differences between the two 
samples. 
3.3. Main variables of interest  
3.3.1. Innovation 
We measure innovation at the firm level by employing two measures. Our first measure is 
based on the patent count, defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents 
(LNPAT) granted for each firm in each year. This variable reflects the quantity of a firm’s 
innovation output. Our second measure is based one the citation count of the patent, defined as the 
natural logarithm of one plus the total number of citations for all patents applied for during the 
year, adjusted by time-technology class (LNCIT). This variable reflects the technological or 
economic significance of the firm’s innovation, as patents that are more significant are expected 
to be cited more frequently. . 
3.3.2. Wedge between voting and cash flow rights 
Firms with a dual-class ownership structure are characterized as those having at least two 
classes of shares with differing voting rights—superior voting shares and inferior voting shares. 
The superior voting shares provide more than one vote per share (e.g., having eight votes per share) 
and the inferior voting shares provide zero vote per share. For each class of stock, we estimate the 
extent of divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights (Francis et al., 2005) by defining 
a variable, WEDGE, from the standpoint of inferior class shareholders: 
WEDGE = 1 - Voting rights/Cash flow rights,                           (2) 
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where Voting rights is the fraction of total votes held by inferior class stockholders, calculated as 
the number of votes on a per inferior share basis times the number of these shares (inferior votes), 
scaled by the sum of inferior votes (as defined above) and superior votes (the number of votes on 
a per superior share basis times the number of these shares). Cash flow rights is the percentage of 
total cash flow rights held by inferior class shareholders, which is calculated by the ratio between 
the number of inferior class shares and the sum of inferior class and superior class shares. The 
range of a value of WEDGE is between zero and one. WEDGE equals one when the inferior class 
shareholders have null voting rights, which is the case at the end of continuum of the control-
ownership wedge. WEDGE approaches zero as the voting and cash flow rights of the inferior 
shares become equal. 
3.3.3. Voting premium 
Because superior voting shares have extra voting power, these shares at dual-class firms 
are typically pricier than inferior voting shares. The price differential is termed a voting premium. 
The voting premium arises when outside shareholders trade the two classes of shares with differing 
voting rights in public stock markets and measures the value that these generic shareholders set on 
the extra votes associated with superior shares. The voting premium captures the lower end of the 
size of private control benefits because the generic shareholders who purchase superior voting 
shares but do not acquire control of the firm will realize the value of their superior votes only when 
a future control contest occurs (Zingales, 1994, 1995; Doidge, 2004).6 We calculate the voting 
premium as the ratio between the market price of a voting right and the market price of a cash flow 
                                               
6 Zingales (1995) cites three cases in which changes in the voting power occurred. In each case, the premium 
associated with the superior voting shares surged around the respective event. These cases are: the unexpected death 
of the largest shareholder at Resorts International; a conflict among the Wang family at Wang Laboratories; and the 
decision by the largest shareholder’s at Moog Inc. to exchange his stock holdings for assets because of differences of 
view with the board of directors. 
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right (Zingales, 1995; Doidge, 2004): 
VOTING_PREMIUM  = (PS-PI)/(PI-rv*PS),                                                  (3) 
where rv denotes the ratio of the number of votes associated with an inferior voting share of stock 
and that associated with a superior voting share of stock and PS and PI denote the market closing 
price of a firm’s superior voting shares and inferior voting shares, respectively. The measure for 
voting premium in Eq. (3) considers the heterogeneity of the dual-class structure across 
jurisdictions, since it is adjusted by the number of votes of an inferior voting share scaled by the 
number of votes of a superior voting share. 
3.3.4. Opacity 
Opacity in the reported earnings can affect firm innovation activities in two different ways. 
On one hand, the dual-class structure may allow insiders to keep their innovative projects as secret 
from potential and current competitors in the product market through opacity, thereby 
circumventing proprietary costs related to firm innovation. For example, Hall (2002) indicates that 
significant cost can incur when leaking information to competitors, which decreases the quality of 
signal on a prospective innovative project. Thus, to the extent that firms’ opacity associated with 
the dual-class structure helps hiding their innovative activities from the marketplace, it can 
potentially improve a firm’s competitive advantage in the product market and, in turn, encourage 
its innovation endeavor. On the other hand, controlling insiders can effectively hide their 
consumption of private gains from firms’ innovative projects from external investors by altering 
real operating and investing decisions and/or by exercising their discretion over accounting choices.  
Given that our analysis centers on opacity related to financial reporting strategies, we 
estimate financial reporting opacity, using the extent to which controlling insiders of dual-class 
firms ‘‘smooth’’ reported earnings series, that is, the extent to which they reduce the variability of 
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reported earnings over time by changing the accrual element of earnings. Following Leuz et al. 
(2003), we estimate “earnings smoothness,” denoted with SMOOTH, as the Pearson correlation 
between the change in firm’s accruals and the change in firm’s cash flow from operations, both 
scaled by lagged total assets. Scaling by lagged total assets permits us to control for the cross-
sectional variation in economic performance, depending on firm size. We calculate the cash flow 
from operations as operating income minus accruals. Accruals are computed as [(Δtotal current 
assets – Δcash) – (Δtotal current liabilities – Δshort-term debt – Δtaxes payable) – depreciation 
expense], where the first and the second bracket terms refer to changes in current assets and 
changes in current liabilities, respectively. Finally, we multiply this correlation measure by minus 
one (-1), such that the value increases in the level of earnings smoothing by controlling insiders.  
3.4. Sample distribution and summary statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our sample distribution for single-class and dual-
class firms.  Our sample comprises of 3,412 firm-year observations for dual-class firms and 7,086 
firm-year observations for single-class firms from 18 countries as the final sample. Panel A of 
Table 1 reports the number of firm-year observations and the percentage of firm-year observations 
by country in the sample. The country with the largest number of firm-year observations in the 
“dual-class” sample is South Korea (25.12%), followed by Italy (14.33%), and Germany (13.16%). 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the industry distribution of our sample. We use Fama-French 48-
industry classification. The firm-year observations are distributed across all industries in the dual-
class sample.  
Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the innovation variables as well as 
control variables used in the main multivariate regression. Appendix A provides detailed variable 
definitions. For the innovation proxies, the average of the natural logarithm of one plus the number 
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of patents (LNPAT) for single-class and dual-class firms is 0.3092 and 0.2757, respectively. The 
average of the natural logarithm of one plus the number of citations (LNCIT) for single-class firms 
and dual-class firms is 0.2896 and 0.2667, respectively. The descriptive statistics in Panel A 
largely support the view that in the full sample the dual-class structure hampers firm innovation 
relative to the single-class structure. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the cash flow rights and voting 
rights of the sample dual-class shares. The inferior shares possess 58.83% on average of the total 
cash flow rights for our sample companies but own only 14.43% of the total voting rights on 
average. The mean (median) inferior voting stock has approximately 0.19 (0.17) vote(s) per cash 
flow right, while the mean (median) superior voting stock has approximately 2.68 (2.02) votes per 
cash flow right. Overall, the descriptive statistics indicate that the dual-class ownership structure 
provides superior (inferior) voting rights to controlling insiders (minority shareholders) relative to 
their cash flow rights.  
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for country-level legal and extra-legal control 
variables that we use in our regression analysis. Detailed description of these variables is provided 
in Appendix A. 
 
4.  Methodology and results 
4.1. Dual-class structure and innovation 
To examine the association between innovation and dual-class structure, we estimate the 
following model: 
INNOi t+2 = β0 + β1DUALit + β2LNATit + β3RDEXPit + β4ROAit + β5PPEit + β6LEVit  + β7CAPEXit  
               + β8BTMit + β9HHIit + β10HHISQit + β11AZSCOREit + β12LNFIRMAGEit + εit,       (4) 
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where INNOi,t+1 is a measure of innovative activities, including the natural logarithm of one plus 
the number of patens, LNPAT, and the natural logarithm of one plus the number of citations, LNCIT, 
at year t + 2. Patents appear in the data set only after a grant date. This delay occurs because the 
lag between a patent’s application year and its grant year is approximately two years on average, 
and thus we use the number of patents and patent citations at year t + 2. The main independent 
variable of interest in this regression specification is DUAL, which is an indicator for dual-class 
firms versus single-class firms. Following prior literature, we include a list of variables known to 
be related to levels of innovation at the firm level (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Brown and Petersen, 
2011; Aghion, Akcigit, and Howitt, 2013; He and Tian, 2013; Hsu, Lee, Liu, and Zhang, 2015; 
Chang, Hilary, Kang, and Zhang, 2017). We control for economies of scale, growth opportunities, 
and profitability by including firm size (LNAT), innovation input (RDEXP), profitability (ROA), 
tangibility (PPE), capital expenditure (CAPEX), book-to-market ratio (BTM), and firm age 
(LNFIRMAGE), respectively. We control for capital structure and firm’s financial constrain risk 
by including leverage ratio (LEV) and Altman z-score (AZSCORE), respectively. In addition, we 
include market concentration ratio (HHI) and its square (HHISQ) to control for firm’s industry 
condition. A detailed description of these control variables is provided in Appendix A. 
Models (1) through (4) of Table 4 provides tests for the association between the dual-class 
ownership structure indicator and innovation. We report t-statistics in parentheses below each 
coefficient estimate based on robust standard errors clustered by year and country (Petersen, 2009). 
Model (1) presents the results with LNPAT in year t + 2 as the dependent variable, and Model (2) 
presents the results with LNCIT in year t + 2 as the dependent variable. Both models include firm-
level control variables as per Eq. (4) and fixed effects for year, country, and industry. In both 
models the coefficient on DUAL is negative and significant indicating that dual-class firms are 
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associated with lower level of innovation. In Models (3) and (4) we include a list of country-level 
control variables in lieu of country fixed effects. The sign and significance of the coefficients 
associated with DUAL are unchanged landing further support for the inverse relation between 
innovation and dual-class structure. 
The control variables generally have the signs that are predicted by prior research. For 
example, HHI is negatively related and HHISQ is positively related to firm innovation in our 
sample, thereby indicating a concave relationship between product market competition and levels 
of firm innovation. This indicates that firms with greater levels of market competition hampers 
firm innovation and this relationship is concave, thereby indicating that the negative relationship 
between market competition and innovation is alleviated at extreme values of market competition. 
Both of these results are consistent with the inverse-U shaped relation found between competition 
and innovation by Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005) for a broad sample of US 
firms.  
The dual-class structure indicator is significantly negatively related to both LNPAT and 
LNCIT at a 5% two-tailed test or better, in Columns (1)-(4) of Table 4. These results support the 
view that the dual-class structure is associated with a decrease in firm innovation. This evidence 
is consistent with the agency cost hypothesis.  
 
4.2. Innovation and control-ownership wedge  
In firms featured by a dual-class structure, the higher the wedge between the voting and 
the cash flow rights the more control the controlling shareholders have over the firm; in fact, they 
have almost complete control over key corporate decisions, including investment and innovative 
activities. This concentrated control power is a double-edged sword. On one hand, this control 
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power can lead to more innovation if the controlling shareholders/managers are well-intentioned 
and invest in positive innovative NPV projects. On the other hand, the control power can lead to 
less innovation if the controlling shareholders/managers are ill-intentioned and overinvest in 
negative NPV projects or outright purloining resources. To explore the relationship between 
innovation and the magnitude of the separation between voting and cash flow rights at the firm 
level, we re-estimate the regression models reported in the first four columns of Table 4, where we 
replace DUAL with WEDGE. Models (5) and (8) of Table 4 report the results. The ownership-
control wedge is significantly negatively related to both LNPAT and LNCIT at a 5% two-tailed test 
or better in all models. These results support the view that the control-ownership wedge aggravates 
firm innovation. An increase of one standard deviation in the control-ownership wedge (e.g., 
18.98%) is correlated with a 2.59% and 1.72% decrease in LNPAT and LNCIT, respectively. Thus, 
the negative correlation between the firm-level wedge and the quantity and quality of firm 
innovation is statistically and economically significant.7 The results further lend support for the 
agency cost hypothesis.  
 
4.3. Firm age 
Prior research documents that firm age affects firm innovation activities (Balasubramanian 
and Lee, 2008). Balasubramanian and Lee (2008) show that firm age has an adverse effect upon 
technical quality, and that this effect is stronger in technologically active areas. For example, each 
additional year of the firm decreases the effect of a 10% increase in R&D intensity on the firm's 
market value by over 3%. To test this, we categorize our sample by age into three groups:  0–5 
                                               
7 While R&D expenditures are an input for innovation, because these expenses might never materialize into a product 
or process, we perform additional analysis where the dependent variable is RDEXP and the independent variable is 
DUAL or WEDGE. We find that the coefficients associated with DUAL and WEDGE are negative and significant. 
Results are available upon request. 
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years, 6–10 years, and 11+ years.8  Then, we replicate Models (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) of Table 4 of the 
effect of the DUAL and WEDGE on the two proxies for firm innovation in these three age groups. 
The results are reported in Table 5. We find that the coefficients on DUAL and WEDGE are 
negatively related to LNPAT and LNCIT and statistically significant at 1% for the 6–10 years and 
11+ years age groups. Notably, for the 0–5 years age group the coefficients on DUAL and WEDGE 
are positive and statistically significant at 10% for LNCIT.  These results suggest that the effect of 
managerial consumption of private benefits in hampering innovation is strongest for old and 
mature firms. The positive coefficients associated with our innovation proxies in Models (1)–(4), 
coupled with the negative and significant coefficients at 1% in Models (5)–(12) support out 
conjecture that the risk tolerance hypothesis holds true for younger firms and the agency cost 
hypothesis holds true for older firms.  
 
4.4. Earnings smoothing 
We go one step further and investigate whether the combined effect of agency problems 
and opacity affects firm innovation. This interaction effect is insinuated by prior research that the 
incentives to expropriate some firm cash flows through opacity may create financing frictions, 
thereby hampering corporate innovation (e.g., Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker, 2003; Biddle and 
Hilary, 2006; Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi, 2009; Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang, 2011). To illustrate 
how agency problems and opacity are both necessary to hamper innovation, we consider the model 
designed by Jin and Myers (2006), who discuss two extreme cases: 1) an opaque firm operated by 
an angelic manager who serves shareholder interests, and 2) a completely transparent firm operated 
                                               
8 Of the dual class firm years in our full unmatched sample, 9.00%, 29.08%, and 60.92% are in the 0-5 years, 6-10 
years, and 11+ years groups respectively, whereas in the single class firm sample the distribution is 38.28%, 23.76%, 
and 37.96%.   
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by a self-interested manager who extracts rents due to poor investor protection. In these two 
extreme cases, the corporate innovation policy does not change and is predicted to be aligned with 
those preferred by shareholders. Hence, both an agency conflict, where assets are expropriated and 
opacity are needed in order to induce managerial consumption of private benefits. Our proxy for 
opaqueness is SMOOTH. Table 6 shows the results of our model after adding the interaction of 
DUAL*SMOOTH or WEDGE*SMOOTH as an explanatory variable in Eq. (4). The coefficients 
associated with these interaction terms are negative and statistically significant at conventional 
levels, with p-values less than 10%. Table 6 provides a strong support for the negative impact of 
opacity on corporate innovation. Opacity associated with the dual-class structure appears to 
facilitate managerial concealment of their rent extraction from innovative projects rather than 
reducing the proprietary costs due to the innovation information spillover to potential and current 
competitors. These results support our prior conjecture that opacity aggravates the relationship 
between dual-class structure and innovation. 
 
4.5. External disciplining mechanisms and growth opportunities 
Thus far, our results based on the full sample show a negative and significant relationship 
between innovation and dual-class structure and more so when the divergence between voting 
rights and control rights is greater. These results imply that the controlling shareholders and/or 
managers on average are not well-intentioned but rather consistent with the incentive of the 
controlling insiders consuming private control benefits at the expense of minority shareholders 
and obfuscate their dysfunctional behavior through opaque financial reporting. Controlling 
managers and/or shareholders will misbehave when they are given the opportunity to do that. The net 
benefits to controlling shareholders and/or managers from extracting rent rather than investing in 
innovative projects for the firm is contingent upon the effectiveness of external disciplining—when 
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the external country-level environment is good, when the firm is followed by more analysts, 
institutional ownership and for high growth industries. Table 7 reports the regression results for all 
these categories of external disciplining mechanisms.  
Panel A of Table 7 reports results conditional on ANTI-SD. The first two columns show 
that the interaction between ANTI-SD and DUAL is positively associated with LNPAT and LNCIT. 
The last two columns show that the coefficient on WEDGE * ANTI-SD is also positive and 
significant at 1% or less. This evidence provides a strong support for the prediction that anti-self-
dealing rules will limit managerial rent extraction that accompany the ownership-control wedge 
and thus moderate the adverse impact of the dual-class structure and wedge upon firm innovation.   
Panel B of Table 7 show the regression results when we consider the number of analysts 
as an external disciplining mechanism. Derrien and Kecskés (2013) show that firms that lose 
analysts coverage decrease capital expenditures because a decrease in analyst coverage increases 
information asymmetry. Conversely, He and Tian (2013) document that financial analysts hamper 
innovation. In our international sample we document that ANALYST is negatively and significantly 
related to LNCIT, although not significantly, related to LNPAT. These negative coefficients are in 
line with the results reported by He and Tian (2013) that on average analysts can exacerbate the 
short-termism problem. Notably, the coefficients associated with DUAL*ANALYST and 
WEDGE*ANALYST are positive and significant in all models. These results indicate that firms 
with greater analysts’ coverage of the firm display a less negative relationship between the 
ownership-control wedge and innovation across the two measures of innovation.  
Panel C of Table 7 show regressions results when we consider the amount of institutional 
ownership. The value of large shareholders as monitors is well-recognized (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). We find that the coefficient associated with INS_OWNERSHIP and the interaction of this 
variable with DUAL and WEDGE are insignificant when the dependent variable is LNPAT 
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(columns 1 and 3). Notably, in Models (2) and (4), where the dependent variable is LNCIT the 
coefficient on INS_OWNERSHIP is negative and significant at 5% while the coefficients on the 
interaction term DUAL*INS_OWNERSHIP and WEDGE*INS_OWNERSHIP are positive and 
significant at 1%. This result provides some support that greater institutional ownership moderates 
the negative relation between dual-class structure, ownership-control wedge and innovation. 
The last panel of Table 7 show results for growth industries. The coefficients associated 
with DUAL*SALES_GROWTH and WEDGE*SALES_GROWTH are positive in all four models 
and significant at 10% in three of them. These results are consistent with a substitution effect 
between internal corporate governance and external market driven mechanism of disciplining 
corporate insiders to act in the best interest of all shareholders.  
The results in Table 7 lend support to the notion that the external disciplining mechanism 
and high growth opportunities help alleviate the effects of negative agency costs associated with 
dual-class structure, which is consistent with our predictions. 
 
4.6. Voting premium 
We now turn to additional tests that we believe provide even more direct evidence with 
respect to managerial consumption of private control benefits and innovation. An advantage of our 
empirical setting is that we are able to quantify the extent to which agency conflicts and opacity, 
the two key ingredients that can promote or hamper corporate innovation, appear to contribute to 
the observed association between the ownership-control wedge and innovation. The ownership-
control wedge is relatively easy to observe for our sample of dual-class firms, and indeed can be 
determined for much larger samples that also capture ownership-control divergence arising from 
other means like pyramid ownership structures. However, prior research shows that the pyramid 
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ownership structure does not create the wedge to a significant extent (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 
2006). Thus, we focus our sample on dual-class structure firms because this structure allows us to 
construct a proxy for the severity of the agency conflict that accompanies the dual-class structure 
by calculating the voting premium attached to superior voting shares. As discussed earlier, the 
voting premium reflects the value that market participants place on the additional votes attached 
to superior shares. It provides a lower bound on the private benefits of control that the controlling 
shareholder can entertain, because the market participants who purchase superior voting shares but 
do not gain control of the company will only realize the value of their superior votes in the event 
of a future control contest. 
 Specifically, we replace the ownership-control wedge with the voting premium in the 
regressions that explains our two proxies for firm innovation. Results are reported in Table 8. The 
objective of this design is to examine if there is a direct relation between the size of the private 
benefits of control associated with the voting premium and our proxies for innovation. The voting 
premium is negatively related to our proxies for innovation at the 10% or better level in two-tailed 
tests. This is the most direct evidence we know in the literature of agency conflicts engendering 
incentives for managerial consumption of private benefits being a factor that hampers firm 
innovation. Table 8 supports and provides direct evidence for the agency cost hypothesis. 
 
5.  Two-stage simultaneous equation analysis 
The choice to separate control rights from ownership rights through the dual-class structure 
is not random, and the literature indicates that the decision to separate ownership and control rights 
through the dual-class structure is a function of the size of managers’ private benefits of control 
(Gompers et al., 2010). To address the self-selection concern related to the control-ownership 
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wedge, we design the two-stage model (Heckman, 1979). While the use of regressor variables 
lagging the dependent variable substantially reduces the likelihood of endogeneity (and reverse 
causation), we use a conventional two-stage instrumental variables approach as a further check. 
We select variables that should not relate to the future innovation at the firm level, yet correlate 
positively with the contemporaneous WEDGE or DUAL for firm i at time t. These instrumental 
variables are an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company name includes a person’s name at the 
IPO date and 0 otherwise (FAMILYNAME), an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm belongs to 
the media industry (MEDIA), an indicator for firm’s local presence at the time of the IPO 
(LOCALMAKSHARE), a rank for the firm’s profitability (PROFITRANK), and a rank for the firm’s 
sales revenue (SALESRANK) (Gompers et al., 2010).  
Based on Gompers et al. (2010), we first estimate the following selection equation via a 
probit regression, which models the decision to establish a dual-class ownership structure at the 
IPO date and remain a dual-class firm during the sample period:  
WEDGEi,t or DUALit= α + β1FAMILYNAMEi + β2MEDIAi + β3LOCALMARKETSHAREi β4PROFITRANKi  
+ β5SALESRANKi + β6SIZEi,t + β7RDEXPi,t + β8ROAi,t + β9PPEi,t + β10LEVi,t  
+ β11CAPEXi,t + β12BTMi,t + β13HHIi,t + β14HHISQi,t + β15AZSCOREOAi,t 
    + β16RLNFIRMAGEi,t + ε,        (5) 
 
where the definitions of variables are detailed in Appendix A. Specifically, we first regress 
WEDGE on FAMILYNAME, MEDIA, LOCALMARKETSHARE, PROFITRANK, and SALESRANK and 
the control variables in Table 4 and then use predicted firm WEDGE or DUAL from this first-stage 
regression as the WEDGE or DUAL variable in the second-stage regression. The results are 
reported in Table 9. As shown in Table 9, the coefficients for predicted WEDGE and DUAL are 
significantly negative. This suggests that potential endogeneity concerning WEDGE or DUAL and 
future innovation is unlikely to contaminate our results.  
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To validate our choice of the instrumental variables, we follow Larcker and Rusticus (2010) 
and conduct weak instrument identification. The Pseudo R2 of the first stage regression related to 
WEDGE is 34% and partial F is 165.37. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 80.67, which 
exceeds the 10% (25%) critical value of 16.38 (8.96) based on Stock and Yogo (2005). Similar 
statistics emerge in column 4. The Pseudo R2 of the first stage regression related to DUAL is 33% 
and partial F is 162.16. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 112.85, which exceeds the 10% (25%) 
critical value of 16.38 (8.96) based on Stock and Yogo (2005).  Overall, the results suggest that 
the instrument passes the weak instrument tests by explaining a significant amount of the wedge. 
This test supports the contention that the instrumental variable improves the specification over the 
OLS estimation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we juxtaposed firms with dual-class share structure and firms with a single-
class share structure (one share, one vote) in terms of corporate innovation. This research question 
is important in light of the significant effect of innovation for economic growth and development 
and the increased prevalence of dual-class shares in the US and around the world.  
Using hand-collected data for 336 dual-class firms from 18 countries for the period 1993 
to 2010, we provide firm-level international evidence that the dual-class structure is positively 
related to innovation for younger firms and negatively related to innovation when the firm is older 
and more opaque. We show that the negative relationship between the ownership-control wedge 
and corporate innovation is mitigated by external disciplining mechanisms such as when the 
external country-level environment is good, when there is more analysts’ coverage, the 
competition is high, and when growth opportunities are greater. 
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Our results are robust to different regression specifications and the inclusion of a battery 
of control variables previously shown to explain firm-level innovation. Notably, our results are 
robust to two-stage simultaneous regression test which addresses the fact that the choice of dual-
class structure is not random. Moreover, while our results contribute to academic research that 
explores factors that affect firm-level innovative activities, our evidence has timely implications 
to policy regulators and practitioners.  
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
 
DUAL =  Equals one if the firm is a dual-class firm and zero otherwise. 
WEDGE = The wedge between voting and cash flow rights, defined as one minus the 
ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights for inferior voting shares. 
VOTING_PREMIUM =  (PS-PI)/(PI-rv*PS), where PS and PI are the market closing price of a firm’s 
superior voting shares and inferior voting shares, respectively. The ratio of 
the number of votes of an inferior voting share to that of a superior voting 
share is denoted with rv. 
LNPAT = The natural logarithm of one plus firm i's total number of patents in year t. 
LNCIT = The natural logarithm of one plus firm i's total number of citations received 
on the firm’s patents in year t. 
 
LNAT = The natural log of total assets at the end of fiscal year t. 
RDEXP = Research and development (R&D) expenditure scaled by total assets at the 
end of fiscal year t, set to 0 if missing. 
ROA = Return on assets ratio calculated as Income before extraordinary items 
scaled by total assets at the end of fiscal year t. 
PPE = Property, plant, & equipment scaled by total assets at the end of fiscal year 
t. 
LEV = Firm i's leverage ratio, defined as debt scaled by total assets at the end of 
fiscal year t. 
CAPEX = Capital expenditure scaled by total assets at the end of fiscal year t. 
BTM = The natural log of the firm’s book value of common equity scaled by its 
market value of common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t. 
SMOOTH = The Pearson correlation, multiplied by minus one, between the change in 
firm’s accruals and the change in firm’s cash flow from operations, both 
scaled by lagged total assets (Leuz et al., 2003). The cash flow from 
operations is operating income minus accruals, where accruals are 
computed as [(Δtotal current assets – Δcash) – (Δtotal current liabilities – 
Δshort-term debt – Δtaxes payable) – depreciation expense]. 
HHI = Herfindahl index of two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) of 
industry j to which firm i belongs, measured at the end of fiscal year t. The 
index is based on the sales of all firms with data available in Compustat 
Global for the non-US firms and Compustat North America for the U.S. 
firms. 
HHISQ = HHI × HHI. 
AZSOCRE = Modified Altman's (1968) Z-score = (1.2*working capital + 1.4*Retained 
earnings + 3.3*EBIT +0.999*Sales)/Total Assets that are estimated in the 
fiscal year before loan initiation. As done in Graham et al. (2008), we use a 
modified Z-score, which excludes the ratio of market value of equity to 
book value of total debt, because a similar term, market-to-book, enters the 
regressions as a separate variable. 
WWINDEX = Whited and Wu’s (2006) financial constrain measure =–0.091 [(ib + dp)/at] 
– 0.062[indicator set to one if dvc + dvp is positive, and zero otherwise] + 
0.021[dltt/at] – 0.044[log(at)] + 0.102[average industry sales growth, 
estimated separately for each three-digit SIC industry and each year, with 
sales growth defined as above] – 0.035[sales growth] 
LNFIRMAGE = The natural log of one plus the firm age, approximated by the number of 
years listed on Compustat Global. 
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INS_OWNERSHIP = The institutional ownership in a firm, scaled by a firm’s market 
capitalization. Source: Worldscope and FactSet/LionShares Institutional 
Ownership. 
COMPETITION = HHI multiplied by minus one. 
ANALYST = The log of the number of analyst following the firm according to I/B/E/S. 
SALES_GROWTH = The percentage change in sales in a given year in the Fama and French 
industry to which the firm belongs. 
FAMILYNAME  = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company name includes a person’s name 
at the IPO date, 0 otherwise. 
MEDIA = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to a media industry at the 
IPO date, 0 otherwise. Gompers et al. (2010) define media industries as 
those with SIC codes 2710–2711, 2720–2721, 2730–2731, 4830, 4832–
4833, 4840–4841, 7810, 7812, and 7820  
LOCALMKTSHARE  = Ratio of firm i’s sales relative to the sales of all other firms in the country.  
PROFITRANK = Firm i’s percentile rank of profitability calculated as the ratio of firm i’s 
profitability in its IPO year relative to other firms in the same IPO year;  
SALESRANK = Firm i’s percentile rank of sales calculated as the ratio of firm i’s sales in its 
IPO year relative to other firms in the same IPO year;  
ANTI-SD = The anti-self-dealing index measures the country-level formal legal rules of 
minority shareholder protection against expropriation by corporate insiders. 
It ranges from one to zero, with higher index values indicating stronger 
protection of minority shareholders against expropriation. Source: Djankov, 
et al. (2008). 
LEGAL ENFORCE  The mean of the following three variables from La Porta et al. (1998):  the 
efficiency of the judicial system, an assessment of rule of law, and the 
corruption index. The range for each variable is from zero to ten. 
TAKEOVER 
REGULATIONS 
 ‘‘[a]verages three variables of investor protection during a corporate 
control contest: (1) 1 if the legal code requires a control contestant to offer 
all classes the same tender price, 0 otherwise; (2) 1 if the legal code requires 
a buyer of a large or majority block to pay minority shareholders the same 
price as for the block shares by share class, 0 otherwise; and (3) 1 minus the 
level of ownership at which a dominant vote-owner is legally required to 
make an open market bid for all shares, 0 if there is no such provision in the 
law. Higher values indicate stricter takeover law’’ (Nenova, 2003). 
OWNERSHIP 
CONCENTRATION 
 ‘‘[t]he average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest 
shareholders in the ten largest nonfinancial, privately owned domestic firms 
in a given country’’ (La Porta et al., 1998). 
NEWSPAPER 
CIRCULATION 
 ‘‘[c]irculation of daily newspapers/population’’ (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). 
TAX COMPLIANCE  This variable ranges from 0 to 6, where higher scroes indicate more tax 
compliance. The variable is from The Global Competitiveness Report 1996 
as reported in La Porta et al. (1999). 
CORRUPT 
CONTROL 
 The variable captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a 
standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 
(WorldBank Governance Indicators, Kaufmann et al., 2011; 2013). 
IPOs/POP  The number of initial public offerings of equity in a given country divided 
by its population in millions. 
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DOMESTIC 
FIRMS/POP 
 The number of listed firms in a given country divided by its population in 
millions. 
EXTERNAL 
CAPITAL/GNP 
 ‘‘The stock market capitalization held by minorities is computed as the 
product of the aggregate stock market capitalization and the average 
percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in 
the ten largest non-financial, privately owned domestic firms in a given 
country. A firm is considered privately owned if the State is not a known 
shareholder in it’’ (La Porta et al., 1997). 
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Appendix B. Using the Compustat Global universe as the control group 
 
Table B1. OLS regression of WEDGE on corporate innovation 
 
Dep. variable =  LNPAT t+2 
(1) 
LNCIT t+2 
(2) 
   
WEDGE -0.2370 -0.2652 
 (-4.61)*** (-4.75)*** 
LNAT 0.0729 0.0781 
 (22.90)*** (21.55)*** 
RDEXP 0.2915 0.3979 
 (9.68)*** (10.01)*** 
ROA 0.0013 0.0067 
 (0.46) (1.79)* 
PPE -0.0236 -0.0352 
 (-2.51)** (-3.07)*** 
LEV -0.0533 -0.0670 
 (-8.10)*** (-8.17)*** 
CAPEX 0.2473 0.4180 
 (7.22)*** (8.54)*** 
BTM -0.0003 -0.0006 
 (-0.15) (-0.31) 
HHI 0.2937 0.0499 
 (6.18)*** (0.76) 
HHISQ -0.3564 -0.1491 
 (-7.61)*** (-2.33)** 
AZSCORE -0.0027 -0.0032 
 (-14.32)*** (-13.88)*** 
LNFIRMAGE 0.0146 0.0156 
 (2.88)*** (2.44)** 
   
   
   
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes 
Obs. 157,780 157,780 
Adj. R2 0.181 0.151 
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Appendix C. Propensity Score Matching: Probability of Adopting a Dual-class Ownership 
Structure 
 
This appendix presents results of the propensity score matching. The sample period is from 
1993 to 2010. The propensity score matching procedure pairs treatment firms with control firms, 
which have close values of the propensity score. To empirically run this procedure we first run a 
logistic regression model to estimate the probability of being a dual-class firm using the sample of 
treatment firms and the control sample of single-class firms. As our covariates we use all the firm-
level control variables in Eq. (1) and country, industry, and year fixed effects. The logistic 
regression model generates probabilities, allowing us to estimate the propensity score for each firm. 
We pair each treatment firm with the control firms employing the caliper matching technique with 
replacement (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). This method that uses all observations within a pre-set 
propensity score range or caliper, that is, 0.01.  Table C1 reports the result from performing the 
logistic regression model and Table C2 reports the covariate balance analysis. 
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Table C1. First-stage model 
 
  Pr(Dual)  
    
FAMILYNAME  0.3031  
  (5.69)***  
MEDIA  1.0020  
  (18.54)***  
LOCALMAKSHARE  3.9625  
  (26.94)***  
PROFITRANK  0.3146  
  (6.74)***  
SALESRANK  -1.3867  
  (-22.32)***  
LNAT  0.0726  
  (10.23)***  
RDEXP  -3.0532  
  (-8.62)***  
ROA  -0.0457  
  (-0.47)  
PPE  0.0806  
  (2.25)**  
LEV  0.0964  
  (1.52)  
CAPEX  -2.1597  
  (-7.51)***  
BTM  0.0069  
  (4.08)***  
HHI  0.4244  
  (2.22)**  
HHISQ  -0.5479  
  (-2.58)***  
WWINDEX  0.0538  
  (5.90)***  
LNFIRMAGE  0.2536  
  (13.34)***  
    
Country dummies  YES  
Year dummies  YES  
Industry dummies  YES  
Area Under ROC Curve   0.9673  
Dual Class Observations  3,735  
Single Class Observations  127,793  
Chi-sq  22736.67  
Pseudo Rsq  0.674  
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Table C2. Covariate balance analysis 
 
Dual-class firms Single-class firms Standardized 
difference 
 Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance 
LNAT 9.4907 8.0585 10.2925 9.4047 -0.2713 0.8569 
RDEXP 0.0105 0.0016 0.0120 0.0011 -0.0404 1.4982 
ROA 0.0185 0.0156 -0.0053 0.0131 0.1986 1.1956 
PPE 0.6229 0.1406 0.8282 0.5973 -0.3381 0.2354 
LEV 0.2894 0.0322 0.3016 0.0413 -0.0635 0.7809 
CAPEX 0.0487 0.0028 0.0600 0.0024 -0.2200 1.1521 
BTM 0.1258 2.9320 0.2007 4.3051 -0.3938 0.6811 
HHI 0.2232 0.0512 0.2171 0.0471 0.0276 1.0868 
HHISQ 0.1010 0.0402 0.0942 0.0390 0.0341 1.0312 
WWINDEX -0.3274 0.2716 -0.2621 0.2455 -0.1286 1.1063 
AZSCORE 1.3528 2.2263 0.7942 3.2545 0.3374 0.6841 
LNFIRMAGE 2.3919 0.4905 1.9200 0.7660 0.5954 0.6403 
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Table 1 Sample distribution 
 
Panel A: Sample distribution by country 
 
 Single-class firms Dual-class firms 
Country # of firm-year Percentage # of firm-year Percentage 
Australia 44 0.62% 23 0.67% 
Brazil 892 12.59% 401 11.75% 
Chile 86 1.21% 55 1.61% 
Denmark 109 1.54% 131 3.84% 
Finland 188 2.65% 179 5.25% 
France 97 1.37% 70 2.05% 
Germany 759 10.71% 449 13.16% 
Italy 507 7.15% 489 14.33% 
Luxembourg 7 0.10% 3 0.09% 
Mexico 117 1.65% 72 2.11% 
Netherland 36 0.51% 18 0.53% 
Norway 54 0.76% 106 3.11% 
Portugal 66 0.93% 18 0.53% 
South Africa 137 1.93% 51 1.49% 
South Korea 2,970 41.91% 857 25.12% 
Sweden 882 12.45% 409 11.99% 
Switzerland 69 0.97% 50 1.47% 
United Kingdom 66 0.93% 31 0.91% 
     
Total 7,086 100.00 3,412 100.00 
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Panel B: Sample distribution by industry 
 
 Single-class firms Dual-class firms 
Fama-French 48 Industry Classification # of firm-year Percentage # of firm-year Percentage 
Aircraft (24) 15 0.21 41 1.20 
Alcoholic Beverages (4) 22 0.31 77 2.26 
Apparel (10) 137 1.93 135 3.96 
Automobiles and Trucks (23) 69 0.97 208 6.10 
Banking (44) 141 1.99 0 0.00 
Business Services (34) 24 0.34 83 2.43 
Business Supplies (38) 91 1.28 157 4.60 
Candy and Soda (3) 9 0.13 41 1.20 
Chemicals (14) 106 1.50 123 3.60 
Computers (35) 4 0.06 43 1.26 
Construction (18) 48 0.68 196 5.74 
Construction Materials (17) 63 0.89 266 7.80 
Consumer Goods (9) 173 2.44 109 3.19 
Electrical Equipment (22) 27 0.38 41 1.20 
Electronic Equipment (36) 63 0.89 118 3.46 
Entertainment (7) 79 1.11 17 0.50 
Food Products (2) 72 1.02 164 4.81 
Healthcare (11) 0 0.00 18 0.53 
Insurance (45) 64 0.90 23 0.67 
Machinery (21) 362 5.11 185 5.42 
Measuring and Control Equipment (37) 201 2.84 25 0.73 
Medical Equipment (12) 146 2.06 17 0.50 
Non-Metallic and Ind. Matal (28) 12 0.17 11 0.32 
Others (48) 505 7.13 89 2.61 
Personal Services (33) 11 0.16 13 0.38 
Petroleum and Natural Gas (30) 238 3.36 104 3.05 
Pharmaceutical Products (13) 95 1.34 112 3.28 
Printing and Publishing (8) 35 0.49 48 1.41 
Real Estate (46) 1 0.01 0 0.00 
Recreational Products (6) 10 0.14 34 1.00 
Restaurants, Hotel, Motel (43) 8 0.11 31 0.91 
Retail (42) 144 2.03 168 4.92 
Rubber and Plastic Products (15) 5 0.07 27 0.79 
Ship Building, Railroad Equipment (25) 2 0.03 25 0.73 
Shipping Containers (39) 21 0.30 2 0.06 
Steel Works, Etc. (19) 307 4.33 152 4.45 
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Telecommunications (32) 2,649 37.38 146 4.28 
Textiles (16) 635 8.96 32 0.94 
Trading (47) 9 0.13 0 0.00 
Transportation (40) 109 1.54 187 5.48 
Utilities (31) 329 4.64 96 2.81 
Wholesale (41) 45 0.64 48 1.41 
     
Total 7,086 100.00 3,412 100 
 
The table provide statistics on the distribution of the sample.  It reports the number of firm-year observations and the number of firms for single-class and dual-
class firms by country (Panel A) and by industry (Panel B).  The sample comprises 3,412 firm-year observations for dual-class firms and 7,086 firm-year 
observations for single-class firms from 18 countries as the final sample during the period from 1993 to 2010.  
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for variables 
 Single-class firms Dual-class firms 
 N  Mean Std P25 Median P75 N  Mean Std P25 Median P75 
Dependent  variables:        
LNPAT 7,086 0.3092 1.1032 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3,412 0.2757 0.9645 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LNCIT 7,086 0.2896 1.2095 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3,412 0.2667 1.0818 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Control variables:        
LNAT 7,086 10.5814 2.6919 8.1630 11.7895 12.9702 3,412 9.6802 2.7265 7.4463 9.5483 12.9702 
RDEXP 7,086 0.0098 0.0299 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3,412 0.0089 0.0378 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ROA 7,086 -0.0040 0.1111 -0.0476 0.0041 0.0541 3,412 0.0196 0.1293 0.0045 0.0270 0.0570 
PPE 7,086 0.7967 0.4465 0.3727 0.8715 1.1432 3,412 0.6241 0.3827 0.3392 0.6023 0.8742 
LEV 7,086 0.3047 0.1899 0.1626 0.3249 0.3805 3,412 0.2965 0.1793 0.1660 0.2874 0.4091 
CAPEX 7,086 0.0586 0.0488 0.0224 0.0579 0.0718 3,412 0.0502 0.0514 0.0169 0.0390 0.0666 
BTM 7,086 20.2521 21.1318 0.7692 5.9029 44.0623 3,412 13.4888 17.9099 0.9344 3.2315 25.8918 
HHI 7,086 0.2170 0.2231 0.0818 0.1217 0.2541 3,412 0.2349 0.2295 0.0714 0.1407 0.3233 
HHISQ 7,086 0.0969 0.2039 0.0067 0.0148 0.0646 3,412 0.1078 0.2011 0.0051 0.0198 0.1045 
AZSCORE 7,086 0.7484 1.1189 0.0936 0.6303 1.3610 3,412 1.2820 1.5796 0.8618 1.2734 1.7755 
LNFIRMAGE 7,086 1.8033 0.7461 1.0986 1.7918 2.3979 3,412 2.1951 0.5886 1.7918 2.3026 2.6391 
             
 
Panel B: Sample Description—Information on the cash flow rights and voting rights of sample dual-class shares 
 N  Mean Median Std P25 P75 
Voting premium 3,412 0.1484 0.0999 1.6601 -1.0174 1.3127 
       
Inferior shares (in millions) 3,412 82.8374 20.3810 195.6807 4.0000 66.2360 
Superior shares (in millions) 3,412 67.2999 13.6565 225.3123 1.8780 36.3400 
       
Inferior cash flow rights % 3,412 0.5883 0.5538 0.1951 0.4417 0.7421 
Superior cash flow rights % 3,412 0.4117 0.4462 0.1951 0.2579 0.5583 
       
Inferior voting rights % 3,412 0.1443 0.0909 0.1754 0.0000 0.2068 
Superior voting rights % 3,412 0.8557 0.9091 0.1754 0.7932 1.0000 
       
Inferior voting rights to cash flow rights 3,412 0.1934 0.1766 0.1898 0.0000 0.2804 
Superior voting rights to cash flow rights 3,412 2.6830 2.0264 1.4517 1.6946 3.0416 
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This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the main regression analysis. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for patent and citation variables 
and controls separate for the dual-class and single-class firms. Panel B reports information for inferior and superior voting shares. All variables are measured at the 
end of the fiscal year. Inferior (Superior) refers to the inferior voting shares (superior voting shares). The inferior and superior shares are the number of shares 
outstanding in millions. The cash flow rights are in percentage terms and are estimated as the number of shares outstanding for inferior our superior class of shares 
dividend by the total number of shares outstanding for both classes of stock. Voting rights are in percentage terms and are estimated as the number of each class’s 
total votes, inferior or superior, (equal to their votes per share times the number of shares outstanding) divided by the sum of the total votes for both classes. The 
sample comprises 3,412 firm-year observations for dual-class firms and 7,086 firm-year observations for single-class firms from 18 countries as the final sample 
during the period from 1993 to 2010.O ther variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
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Table 3. Country-Level Institutional Variables 
 
Countries 
Legal Institutions Extra-Legal Institutions 
 ANTI-
SD 
Legal 
Enforce 
Takeover 
Regulations 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Newspaper 
Circulation 
Tax 
Compliance 
Corrupt 
Control IPOs/Pop 
Domestic 
Firms/Pop 
External 
Capital 
/Gnp 
Australia 4 9.50 0.20 0.28 3.00 4.58 1.99 8.71 63.55 0.49 
Brazil 3 6.13 0.00 0.63 0.40 2.14 -0.29 0.05 3.48 0.18 
Chile 5 6.52 0.00 0.38 1.00 4.20 1.35 0.35 19.92 0.80 
Denmark 2 9.10 0.63 0.40 3.10 3.70 2.24 1.80 50.44 0.21 
Finland 3 10.00 0.33 0.34 4.60 3.53 2.41 0.60 13.00 0.25 
France 3 8.70 0.42 0.24 2.20 3.86 1.40 0.17 8.05 0.23 
Germany 1 10.00 0.13 0.50 3.10 3.41 1.92 0.08 5.14 0.13 
Italy 1 7.10 0.23 0.60 1.00 1.77 0.41 0.31 3.91 0.08 
Luxembourg 2 10.00 0.00 0.00 5.60 - 1.96 - 7.27 1.34 
Mexico 1 7.72 0.00 0.67 1.00 2.46 -0.40 0.03 2.28 0.22 
Netherlands 2 10.00 0.00 0.31 3.10 3.40 2.27 0.66 21.13 0.52 
Norway 4 10.00 0.39 0.31 5.90 3.96 2.05 4.50 33.00 0.22 
Portugal 3 7.20 0.00 0.59 0.80 2.19 1.37 2.27 19.50 0.08 
South Africa 5 6.40 0.68 0.52 0.34 2.40 0.56 0.05 16.00 1.45 
South Korea 2 5.60 0.23 0.20 3.90 3.29 0.47 0.02 15.88 0.44 
Sweden 3 10.00 0.25 0.28 4.50 3.39 2.10 1.66 12.66 0.51 
Switzerland 2 10.00 0.17 0.48 3.30 4.49 2.13 0.51 33.85 0.62 
UK  5 9.20 0.43 0.15 3.30 4.67 1.94 2.01 35.68 1.00 
           
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the country-level indices of legal and extra-legal institutions. The indices for legal and extra-legal institutions represent 
the effects of the institutional environment on the protection of minority shareholders from a controlling party’s expropriation. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. 
 
 
 52 
 
Table 4. The effect of the ownership-control wedge on corporate innovation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. variable  LNPAT t + 2 LNCIT t + 2 LNPAT t + 2 LNCIT t + 2 LNPAT t + 2 LNCIT t + 2 LNPAT t + 2 LNCIT t + 2 
         
DUAL -0.1721 -0.1270 -0.1884 -0.1378     
 (-3.61)*** (-2.06)** (-3.36)*** (-3.33)***     
WEDGE     -0.1742 -0.1303 -0.2064 -0.1556 
     (-3.80)*** (-2.45)** (-3.61)*** (-3.71)*** 
Firm-level control:         
LNAT 0.1333 0.1140 0.1179 0.1022 0.1329 0.1136 0.1172 0.1016 
 (2.30)** (2.18)** (2.22)** (3.65)*** (2.29)** (2.17)** (2.21)** (3.62)*** 
RDEXP 8.3480 8.3382 8.3445 8.3413 8.4089 8.3809 8.3969 8.3733 
 (1.72)* (1.61) (1.74)* (3.66)*** (1.75)* (1.63) (1.76)* (3.66)*** 
ROA 0.3455 0.4445 0.3822 0.4842 0.3438 0.4432 0.3767 0.4801 
 (2.14)** (4.19)*** (2.57)** (2.74)** (2.14)** (4.34)*** (2.55)** (2.71)** 
PPE -0.0773 0.0116 -0.0615 0.0188 -0.0763 0.0123 -0.0621 0.0179 
 (-1.05) (0.13) (-0.90) (0.33) (-1.03) (0.13) (-0.90) (0.32) 
LEV -0.4034 -0.2902 -0.3447 -0.2427 -0.4001 -0.2875 -0.3428 -0.2409 
 (-2.96)*** (-1.85)* (-2.65)*** (-2.62)** (-2.93)*** (-1.84)* (-2.63)*** (-2.58)** 
CAPEX 1.7321 1.0998 1.6560 1.0213 1.6980 1.0742 1.6299 1.0015 
 (2.44)** (1.91)* (2.46)** (2.87)** (2.42)** (1.90)* (2.44)** (2.81)** 
BTM -0.0033 -0.0030 -0.0042 -0.0037 -0.0033 -0.0030 -0.0042 -0.0037 
 (-1.18) (-1.35) (-1.35) (-2.27)** (-1.17) (-1.38) (-1.36) (-2.26)** 
HHI -0.0117 -0.4629 0.2176 -0.2830 0.0028 -0.4514 0.2347 -0.2685 
 (-0.04) (-1.20) (0.63) (-0.66) (0.01) (-1.18) (0.68) (-0.62) 
HHISQ 0.1855 0.6851 -0.0633 0.4885 0.1678 0.6713 -0.0815 0.4733 
 (0.52) (1.37) (-0.15) (0.92) (0.46) (1.35) (-0.20) (0.89) 
AZSCORE -0.0014 -0.0004 0.0025 0.0030 -0.0015 -0.0005 0.0024 0.0030 
 (-0.07) (-0.02) (0.12) (0.20) (-0.07) (-0.02) (0.11) (0.20) 
LNFIRMAGE 0.1995 0.1826 0.2116 0.1926 0.2021 0.1849 0.2156 0.1964 
 (2.67)*** (2.15)** (2.85)*** (3.58)*** (2.72)*** (2.20)** (2.91)*** (3.66)*** 
Country-level 
control: 
        
ANTI-SD   -0.0126 0.0246   -0.0111 0.0253 
   (-0.24) (0.85)   (-0.21) (0.87) 
Legal Enforce   -0.1095 -0.0756   -0.1041 -0.0722 
   (-1.14) (-2.29)**   (-1.13) (-2.23)** 
Takeover Regulations   -0.3599 -0.4474   -0.3629 -0.4487 
   (-1.00) (-2.46)**   (-1.05) (-2.46)** 
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Ownership 
Concentration 
  
2.8117 2.5833 
  
2.7722 2.5547 
   (2.81)*** (3.88)***   (2.84)*** (3.91)*** 
Newspaper 
Circulation 
  
0.1729 0.1793 
  
0.1755 0.1815 
   (3.27)*** (3.50)***   (3.41)*** (3.54)*** 
Tax Compliance   0.2992 0.2117   0.2837 0.2002 
   (1.60) (2.66)**   (1.58) (2.57)** 
Corrupt Control   0.1781 0.0998   0.1767 0.0994 
   (1.12) (2.17)**   (1.14) (2.17)** 
IPOs/Pop   -0.0985 -0.1190   -0.1011 -0.1205 
   (-1.32) (-2.19)**   (-1.38) (-2.20)** 
Domestic Firms/Pop   -0.1456 -0.1388   -0.1446 -0.1376 
   (-0.80) (-1.73)   (-0.82) (-1.71) 
External Capital/Gnp   -0.0002 0.0068   0.0004 0.0072 
   (-0.03) (1.01)   (0.04) (1.07) 
         
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
Obs. 10,498 10,498 10,498 10,498 10,498 10,498 10,498 10,498 
Adj. R2 0.396 0.323 0.358 0.300 0.397 0.323 0.360 0.301 
 
This table presents the results of testing the association between the ownership-control wedge and corporate innovation. We use two proxies for corporate 
innovation as dependent variables in the analyses, that is, LNPAT and LNCIT. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, based on standard errors clustered by year 
and country. The sample comprises 3,412 firm-year observations for dual-class firms and 7,086 firm-year observations for single-class firms from 18 countries as 
the final sample during the period from 1993 to 2010.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. The effect of the ownership-control wedge on corporate innovation, conditional on firm age 
 
 0-5 years 6-10 years 11+years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dep. variable =  LNPAT 
t+2 
(1) 
LNCIT 
t+2 
(2) 
LNPAT 
t+2 
(3) 
LNCIT 
t+2 
(4) 
LNPAT 
t+2 
(5) 
LNCIT 
t+2 
(6) 
LNPAT 
t+2 
(7) 
LNCIT 
t+2 
(8) 
LNPAT 
t+2 
(9) 
LNCIT 
t+2 
(10) 
LNPAT 
t+2 
(11) 
LNCIT 
t+2 
(12) 
             
DUAL 0.025 0.209*   -0.226*** -0.260***   -0.262*** -0.190***   
 (0.33) (1.96)   (-3.33) (-2.94)   (-4.52) (-3.15)   
WEDGE   0.029 0.215*   -0.224*** -0.247***   -0.260*** -0.176*** 
   (0.35) (1.90)   (-3.09) (-2.65)   (-4.52) (-2.91) 
LNAT 0.094* 0.105 0.094* 0.104 0.195*** 0.241*** 0.196*** 0.242*** 0.098*** 0.063*** 0.099*** 0.064*** 
 (1.78) (1.37) (1.77) (1.36) (5.33) (5.24) (5.36) (5.27) (4.09) (3.17) (4.16) (3.23) 
RDEXP 3.581*** 6.974*** 3.581*** 6.936*** 6.930*** 7.561** 6.864*** 7.501** 
12.085**
* 9.835*** 
11.970**
* 9.781*** 
 (2.76) (3.33) (2.77) (3.28) (3.55) (2.48) (3.50) (2.45) (4.42) (3.74) (4.34) (3.71) 
ROA -0.083 -0.060 -0.084 -0.068 0.551** 0.596* 0.564** 0.612* 0.476 0.041 0.506* 0.060 
 (-0.86) (-0.35) (-0.88) (-0.39) (2.14) (1.76) (2.18) (1.79) (1.62) (0.19) (1.74) (0.28) 
PPE 0.303*** 0.182 0.304*** 0.190 -0.150 -0.162 -0.146 -0.156 -0.302*** -0.209*** -0.298*** -0.205*** 
 (3.45) (1.26) (3.48) (1.32) (-1.65) (-1.52) (-1.61) (-1.47) (-3.80) (-3.58) (-3.76) (-3.55) 
LEV 0.276 0.314 0.276 0.319 -0.600*** -0.604*** -0.608*** -0.611*** -0.398*** -0.363*** -0.390*** -0.360*** 
 (1.02) (0.85) (1.02) (0.86) (-3.70) (-2.84) (-3.75) (-2.87) (-3.19) (-3.67) (-3.10) (-3.61) 
CAPEX 0.098 0.403 0.095 0.373 1.389* 0.616 1.417* 0.644 2.908*** 2.187*** 2.931*** 2.205*** 
 (0.18) (0.48) (0.18) (0.45) (1.83) (0.80) (1.86) (0.83) (4.64) (3.82) (4.66) (3.83) 
BTM -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.69) (-1.22) (-0.68) (-1.20) (-0.35) (-0.85) (-0.37) (-0.85) (-1.10) (-0.84) (-1.15) (-0.88) 
HHI -0.351 -0.903* -0.352 -0.907* -0.907** -1.232** -0.957** -1.297** 0.523 0.217 0.489 0.191 
 (-1.03) (-1.74) (-1.03) (-1.74) (-1.98) (-2.16) (-2.08) (-2.25) (0.69) (0.28) (0.65) (0.25) 
HHISQ 0.381 1.063* 0.382 1.062* 1.074** 1.631*** 1.132** 1.706*** -0.348 -0.063 -0.323 -0.045 
 (1.02) (1.93) (1.03) (1.92) (2.35) (2.86) (2.47) (2.96) (-0.40) (-0.07) (-0.37) (-0.05) 
AZSCORE 0.025 0.073 0.025 0.075 -0.010 -0.004 -0.011 -0.006 -0.020 -0.006 -0.020 -0.006 
 (0.67) (1.31) (0.67) (1.35) (-0.35) (-0.12) (-0.39) (-0.16) (-1.12) (-0.46) (-1.09) (-0.45) 
             
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,108 4,087 4,087 4,087 4,087 
Adj. R2 0.558 0.444 0.558 0.444 0.463 0.453 0.463 0.452 0.441 0.358 0.440 0.357 
 
This table presents the results of testing the relationship between the ownership-control wedge and corporate innovation, conditional on firm age. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses, based on standard errors clustered by year and country. The sample comprises 3,631 firm-year observations for dual-class firms and 7,298 
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firm-year observations for single-class firms from 18 countries as the final sample during the period from 1993 to 2010. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. The effect of the ownership-control wedge on corporate innovation,  
conditional on earnings smoothing 
 
Dep. variable  LNPAT t + 2 
(1) 
LNCIT t + 2 
(2) 
LNPAT t + 2 
(3) 
LNCIT t + 2 
(4) 
     
DUAL -0.002 0.153   
 (-0.02) (1.23)   
WEDGE   0.010 0.171 
   (0.09) (1.31) 
SMOOTH 0.149 0.309 0.146 0.301 
 (0.87) (1.47) (0.87) (1.46) 
DUAL*SMOOTH -0.292* -0.487**   
 (-1.75) (-2.40)   
WEDGE*SMOOTH   -0.310* -0.509** 
   (-1.79) (-2.42) 
LNAT 0.137*** 0.117*** 0.137*** 0.117*** 
 (5.44) (4.50) (5.45) (4.52) 
RDEXP 8.296*** 8.263*** 8.276*** 8.291*** 
 (5.23) (3.95) (5.20) (3.96) 
ROA 0.335* 0.441** 0.335* 0.441** 
 (1.75) (2.20) (1.79) (2.24) 
PPE -0.077 0.020 -0.079 0.018 
 (-1.35) (0.33) (-1.38) (0.30) 
LEV -0.430*** -0.321*** -0.437*** -0.328*** 
 (-3.82) (-3.10) (-3.87) (-3.16) 
CAPEX 1.682*** 0.988*** 1.717*** 1.015*** 
 (4.76) (2.75) (4.84) (2.82) 
BTM -0.003** -0.003* -0.003** -0.003* 
 (-2.22) (-1.69) (-2.28) (-1.73) 
HHI -0.112 -0.596* -0.126 -0.608* 
 (-0.37) (-1.78) (-0.42) (-1.81) 
HHISQ 0.273 0.799** 0.291 0.813** 
 (0.72) (2.15) (0.77) (2.19) 
AZSCORE -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
 (-0.29) (-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.37) 
LNFIRMAGE 0.192*** 0.162*** 0.191*** 0.161*** 
 (4.49) (3.50) (4.46) (3.50) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 10,357 10,357 10,357 10,357 
Adj. R2 0.407 0.333 0.406 0.333 
 
This table presents the results of testing the relationship between the ownership-control wedge and corporate 
innovation, conditional on earnings smoothing. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, based on standard errors 
clustered by year and country. The sample comprises 3,631 firm-year observations for dual-class firms and 7,298 
firm-year observations for single-class firms from 18 countries as the final sample during the period from 1993 to 
2010.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 57 
 
Table 7. The effect of dual-class structure, the ownership-control wedge on corporate innovation, 
conditional on external disciplining mechanisms and growth opportunities 
 
Panel A: Results conditional on the quality of the country-level external environment 
 
Dep. variable =  LNPAT t+2 
(1) 
LNCIT t+2 
(2) 
LNPAT t+2 
(3) 
LNCIT t+2 
(4) 
     
DUAL -0.295*** -0.273***   
 (-4.28) (-3.17)   
WEDGE   -0.292*** -0.272*** 
   (-4.08) (-3.03) 
ANTI-SD -0.391 -0.487   
 (-1.23) (-1.19)   
DUAL* ANTI-SD 0.223** 0.262*   
 (2.06) (1.85)   
ANALYST   -0.378 -0.473 
   (-1.21) (-1.17) 
WEDGE* ANTI-SD   0.218** 0.263* 
   (1.99) (1.84) 
     
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Obs. 10,488 10,488 10,488 10,488 
Adj. R2 0.403 0.330 0.403 0.330 
 
Panel B: Results conditional on number of analysts 
 
Dep. variable =  LNPAT t+2 
(1) 
LNCIT t+2 
(2) 
LNPAT t+2 
(3) 
LNCIT t+2 
(4) 
     
DUAL -0.263*** -0.358***   
 (-3.78) (-4.05)   
WEDGE   -0.285*** -0.387*** 
   (-3.96) (-4.23) 
ANALYST -0.023 -0.076*** -0.026 -0.079*** 
 (-1.22) (-3.24) (-1.39) (-3.39) 
DUAL* ANALYST 0.030* 0.073***   
 (1.68) (3.38)   
WEDGE*ANALYST   0.039** 0.085*** 
   (2.11) (3.75) 
     
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Obs. 10,498 10,498 10,498 10,498 
Adj. R2 0.403 0.341 0.403 0.340 
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Panel C: Results conditional on institutional ownership 
 
Dep. variable =  LNPAT t+2 
(1) 
LNCIT t+2 
(2) 
LNPAT t+2 
(3) 
LNCIT t+2 
(4) 
     
DUAL -0.127** -0.171***   
 (-2.51) (-2.89)   
WEDGE   -0.163*** -0.184*** 
   (-2.94) (-3.08) 
INS_OWNERSHIP 0.017 -0.697** -0.037 -0.677** 
 (0.07) (-2.44) (-0.15) (-2.49) 
DUAL* INS_OWNERSHIP -0.007 0.527***   
 (-0.04) (2.61)   
WEDGE* INS_OWNERSHIP   0.104 0.585*** 
   (0.44) (2.70) 
     
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7,211 10,929 10,929 10,929 
Adj. R2 0.486 0.356 0.486 0.356 
 
Panel D: Results conditional on firm growth opportunities 
 
Dep. variable =  LNPAT t+2 
(1) 
LNCIT t+2 
(2) 
LNPAT t+2 
(3) 
LNCIT t+2 
(4) 
     
DUAL -0.296*** -0.262***   
 (-4.02) (-2.93)   
WEDGE   -0.296*** -0.256*** 
   (-3.94) (-2.76) 
SALES_GROWTH -0.305*** -0.225 -0.299*** -0.214 
 (-2.64) (-1.56) (-2.61) (-1.50) 
DUAL* SALES_GROWTH 0.209* 0.270*   
 (1.69) (1.82)   
WEDGE* SALES_GROWTH   0.208 0.261* 
   (1.62) (1.70) 
     
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 9,729 9,729 9,729 9,729 
Adj. R2 0.411 0.323 0.411 0.323 
 
This table presents the results of testing the relationship between dual-class structure, the ownership-control wedge 
and corporate innovation, conditional on external disciplining mechanisms and growth opportunities. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses, based on standard errors clustered by year and country. The sample comprises 3,412 firm-
year observations for dual-class firms and 7,086 firm-year observations for single-class firms from 18 countries as the 
final sample during the period from 1993 to 2010.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. The effect of the voting premium on corporate innovation 
 
Dep. variable  LNPAT t + 2 
(1) 
LNCIT t + 2 
(2) 
   
VOTING_PREMIUM -0.753*** -0.482* 
 (-2.70) (-1.87) 
LNAT 0.187*** 0.169*** 
 (6.56) (5.64) 
RDEXP 8.385*** 8.248*** 
 (4.13) (2.96) 
ROA 0.104 0.292 
 (0.54) (1.30) 
PPE -0.115 0.049 
 (-1.41) (0.54) 
LEV -0.511*** -0.419** 
 (-3.17) (-2.39) 
CAPEX 2.384*** 1.602*** 
 (4.17) (2.75) 
BTM -0.006*** -0.006** 
 (-2.68) (-2.23) 
HHI 0.069 -0.550 
 (0.18) (-1.13) 
HHISQ 0.214 0.894* 
 (0.45) (1.73) 
AZSCORE 0.017 0.002 
 (0.57) (0.06) 
LNFIRMAGE 0.168*** 0.145** 
 (3.18) (2.26) 
   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Obs. 10,498 10,498 
Adj. R2 0.493 0.403 
 
This table presents the results of testing the relationship between the voting premium and corporate innovation. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses, based on standard errors clustered by year and country. The sample comprises 
3,631 firm-year observations for the dual-class firms and 7,298 firm-year observations for single-class firms from 18 
countries as the final sample during the period from 1993 to 2010.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9. Two-stage regression model 
 
 1st stage 2nd Stage 1st stage 2nd Stage 
Dep. variable  WEDGE LNPAT t + 2 LNCIT t + 2 DUAL LNPAT t + 2 LNCIT t + 2 
       
WEDGE  -0.8278 -0.3810    
  (-12.13)*** (-8.28)***    
DUAL     -0.1508 -0.3756 
     (-3.31)*** (-8.94)*** 
FAMILYNAME 3.0724   1.7366   
 (6.46)***   (6.23)***   
MEDIA -2.0585   -1.1701   
 (-10.34)***   (-11.36)***   
LOCALMAKSHARE 1.8522   1.0116   
 (10.16)***   (10.41)***   
PROFITRANK -0.4966   -0.2356   
 (-4.29)***   (-3.65)***   
SALESRANK -0.5150   -0.2049   
 (-4.16)***   (-2.98)***   
LNAT -0.2678 0.0298 0.0130 -0.1546 0.0411 0.0130 
 (-13.87)*** (10.67)*** (6.91)*** (-14.14)*** (13.29)*** (6.94)*** 
RDEXP -12.0187 3.3490 2.6761 -4.9162 4.3647 2.8228 
 (-10.52)*** (16.17)*** (19.16)*** (-10.24)*** (27.35)*** (21.99)*** 
ROA 0.4267 0.3185 0.2533 0.3556 0.3494 0.2274 
 (1.41) (5.98)*** (7.05)*** (2.27)** (8.13)*** (6.31)*** 
PPE -1.1151 -0.0609 -0.0370 -0.5720 -0.0395 -0.0387 
 (-13.19)*** (-3.77)*** (-3.39)*** (-12.37)*** (-2.88)*** (-3.57)*** 
LEV 1.0111 -0.0477 -0.0595 0.4372 -0.1943 -0.0677 
 (5.49)*** (-1.43) (-2.64)*** (4.41)*** (-7.30)*** (-3.05)*** 
CAPEX -0.5994 0.8278 0.3802 -0.4453 0.8233 0.3576 
 (-0.98) (7.34)*** (5.00)*** (-1.29) (8.95)*** (4.70)*** 
BTM -0.0144 -0.0016 -0.0008 -0.0078 -0.0014 -0.0009 
 (-6.29)*** (-4.07)*** (-3.20)*** (-6.27)*** (-4.03)*** (-3.71)*** 
HHI 2.3152 0.2452 0.0686 1.2303 0.1017 0.0410 
 (4.79)*** (2.70)*** (1.12) (4.51)*** (1.37) (0.67) 
HHISQ -2.0534 -0.3708 -0.1510 -1.0814 -0.2062 -0.1238 
 (-4.07)*** (-3.83)*** (-2.31)** (-3.79)*** (-2.62)*** (-1.91)* 
AZSCORE 0.1750 0.0091 0.0033 0.0472 -0.0050 0.0032 
 (4.71)*** (1.76)* (0.94) (3.59)*** (-1.19) (0.93) 
LNFIRMAGE 1.2980 0.2466 0.1360 0.7054 0.1241 0.1412 
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 (18.79)*** (17.33)*** (14.17)*** (18.79)*** (9.63)*** (14.64)*** 
       
Partial F-statistics F = 165.37 (p < 0.0001) F = 162.16 (p < 0.0001) 
Weak Identification Test Cragg-Donald Wald  F =  80.67 
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 10% Max IV size 16.38 
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 15% Max IV size 8.96 
Cragg-Donald Wald  F =  112.85 
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 10% Max IV size 16.38 
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 15% Max IV size 8.96 
Under-identification test Chi2 =  405.15  (p < 0.0001) Chi2 =  567.65  (p < 0.0001) 
Endogeneity test Chi2 = 198.25  (p < 0.0001) Chi2 = 76.69  (p < 0.0001) Chi2 = 3.19  (p < 0.1) Chi2 = 83.15  (p < 0.0001) 
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 10,498 10,498 10,498 10,498 10,498 10,498 
Pseudo R2 / Adj. R2 0.340 0.306 0.305 0.333 0.304 0.303 
 
This table reports results on the relationship between the ownership-control wedge and corporate innovation using a two-stage least squares approach. All variables 
are as defined in Appendix A. t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by industry and year. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control variables, and one-tailed when discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of 
coefficient estimate.
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